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DIVORCE LAW REFORM IN MICHIGAN
B. H. Lee*
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Few social questions touch the individual so intimately and
foster such widely divergent views as the question of divorce.
From those who regard marriage as a perpetual and indissoluble
bond instituted by God to those who consider it a terminable
contract between a man and a woman, every shade of opinion can
be found. The subject of marital breakdown is neither new nor
peculiar to our age. As one author has said: "The breakdown of
marriage with provisions for divorce and remarriage is a phe-
nomenon widely recognized in Babylonian, Hebrew, Greek and
Roman law." 1 Nevertheless, ever since Christianity established a
new ideal of life-long marriage, the concept of an indissoluble
union has been prevalent in the western world.
From the 12th to the 17th centuries the English ecclesiastical
courts in effect had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and di-
vorce in England.2 These courts consistently held that a valid
marriage was indissoluble.3 Although at the end of the 17th centu-
ry a divorce could be obtained by a private act of parliament, the
process was both slow and expensive, and only the rich could
afford it. 4 The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act of England 5 for the
first time specifically allowed divorce and transferred all jurisdic-
tion over matrimonial matters from the ecclesiastical courts to a
*Ph.D., 1970, University of London; D. Phil., 1971, Oxford University. Dr. Lee is
presently engaged in research at the University of Michigan Law School under a Ford
Grant for International Legal Studies.
I J. DOMINIAN, MARITAL BREAKDOWN 9 (1968).
20. MCGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 1 (1957). The civil law of England and
Scotland simply had no official doctrine concerning jurisdiction over marriage and divorce.
However, Holdsworth indicates the means by which civil courts passed upon the validity
of marriages in cases involving dower, inheritance, etc., and reached conclusions quite
contrary to the letter of canon law. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 622
(7th ed. 1956).
3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 621-23. McGregor points out, however, that
under certain conditions even the ecclesiastical court found ways of granting the practical
equivalent of divorce while at the same time maintaining the indissolubility of the marriage
bond. 0. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 3.
40. McGREGOR, supra note 2, at' 10-16, and W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at
623-24. Moreover, divorce by private act could only be obtained by men whose wives
were adulterous. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 11.
5 Matrimonial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
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new Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.6 From the out-
set, divorce was fault oriented and could be obtained only upon a
showing of the commission of a "matrimonial offense" 7 by one
spouse against the other. The law recognized as a complete de-
fense to the granting of a divorce a showing that the party seeking
the dissolution had been guilty of such an offense. The curious
result of this law was to grant a divorce when one party was guilty
of a marital offense, but to deny a divorce when both parties were
guilty.8
The development of divorce law in the United States has been
heavily influenced by English divorce law9 which was largely
based on medieval ecclesiastical law. The core of the notion has
always been that people, although they voluntarily enter marriage,
cannot voluntarily dissolve it. The church, and later society and
the state, asserted an interest in the continuation of marriage over
and above the wishes of the parties involved and traditionally
gave courts the power to dissolve marriages only on specified
statutory grounds. 10 Consequently, most jurisdictions in the
United States adopted this "matrimonial offense" or "fault"
ground for divorce. Professor Kay summarized the traditional
approach this way:
The State's interest in marital stability, thus delegated to the
courts, was presumably to be guarded by the judge's diligence
in requiring that plaintiffs evidence clearly established the
ground relied on for a divorce, that defendant had no valid
defense to the plaintiffs suit, and that the parties had not
conspired to put on a false case in order to obtain relief.
Divorce was thus cast in the traditional common law model
of an adversary procedure; plaintiff's success depended on
60. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 17, and W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 624.
70. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 18, describes the grounds for divorce under this act.
These grounds included adultery, cruelty of either spouse, and desertion without cause for
two years. Furthermore, it was somewhat easier for a husband to obtain a divorce than the
wife.
8 For a discussion of the "recrimination" defense to a divorce action, as well as the
defenses of "connivance," "collusion," and "condonation," see Note, Marital Fault v.
Irremediable Breakdown: The New York Problem and the California Solution, 16 N.Y.L.
F. 119, 125-27 (1970).
9 See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 35-39
(1966), for a concise history of the development of American divorce law from its English
heritage. Other useful sources discussing the development of divorce law are: H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 280-85 (1968); McCurdy,
Divorce-A Suggested Approach with Particular Reference to Dissolution for Living
Separate and Apart, 9 VAND. L. REV. 685 (1956); and Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage
and Divorce Law of Western Countries, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1953).
10 See Walker, Disarming the Litigious Man: A Glance at Fault and California's New
Divorce Legislation, I PACIFIC L.J. 182, 184-98 (1970), for a concise discussion of the




proving defendant's fault; both parties, assumed to be at odds
and dealing at arm's length, were expected to bring forth all
the relevant facts about their marriage and its disintegration
to be assessed by the judge in reaching his decision."
In Michigan, a matrimonial offense remained the sole ground
for divorce for over a century. 12 Despite the fact that the system
could produce unsatisfactory results in particular situations, the
fault procedure may have been continued simply because the
alternatives-divorce by consent, divorce by compulsion of an
innocent party, or no divorce at all-were considered more in-
jurious to the interests of society.'
3
In recent years, fault oriented divorce has received widespread
criticism, both from public bodies 14 and from legal scholars.15
Some of the arguments against the traditional fault approach have
been summarized as follows:
The adversary nature of the pleading was often criticized as
causing further polarization of the parties rather than encour-
aging reconciliation. Subject to greater criticism, however,
was the necessity of establishing some matrimonial offense in
order to obtain a divorce. This requirement forced the court
to concentrate upon a superficial "pigeonholing" of the par-
ties' relationship into one of the statutory grounds, and im-
peded the court's inquiry into the real causes of marital
breakdown. In addition, the marital fault doctrine was felt to
be unrealistic in its attempt to place the blame for the break-
down entirely on the individual committing the specified
dct. 16
11 Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1212- 13
(1968).
12 For an early statute setting forth the grounds for divorce in Michigan, see Act of
April 4, 1833, § I, [1833] Mich. (Ter.) Laws 334.
13 See Turner, Retreat From 'Fault'?:An English Lawyer's Views, 46 NEn. L. REV. 64,
72-81 (1967), foradiscussion of reasons supporting the retention of the "fault" grounds.
14 See, e.g., Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family (Cal. 1966), which
was largely responsible for reform of California laws; Report of a Group Appointed by the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society
(S.P.C.K. 1966) (commonly referred to as the Mortimer Commission Report). The latter
English report is discussed at length in Paulsen, Divorce-Canterbury Style, I VALPA-
RAISO L. REV. 93 (1966).
15 See, e.g., Kay, supra note II, 1215-20; Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimina-
tion of Fault in California Divorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1306, 1307-14 (1970):
Couch. Toward a More Realistic Divorce Law, 43 TUL. L. REV. 243, 254-61 (1969);
Cannell, Abolish Fault-Oriented Divorce in Ohio-As a Service to Society and to
Restore Dignity to the Domestic Relations Courts, 4 AKRON L. REV. 92, 93- 106 (1971);
Wadlington, supra note 9, at 81-84; Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce
Proceedings, 10 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 213 (1942); and Bradway, The Myth of the
Innocent Spouse, I I TUL. L. REV. 377 (1937). For a listing of recent critics, see Tenney,
Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 32-34 (1967).
16 Note, California Family Law Act, 3 U. Micti. J.L. REF. 425, 428 (1970).
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Moreover, several authors have pointed out the gap between the
theory and application of the law, with courts in fact granting
divorces even when the literal requirement of a statute could not
have been met had one of the parties contested the divorce.
17
But the fact remains that in dealing with divorce the law is
faced with a dilemma-if divorce is made too easy, the institution
of marriage may be weakened; if it is made too difficult, the cost
to the happiness of the individual may be great. The legal system
must strike a true balance between respect for the binding sanctity
of marriage and the social considerations which make it contrary
to public policy to insist on the maintenance of a union which has
entirely broken down.
II. MICHIGAN No-FAULT DIVORCE
The concept of no-fault divorce is not new. In 1850 Kentucky
adopted a statute which authorized a kind of no-fault divorce
subsequent to a five year period of separation.18 Wiscon-
sin enacted a similar provision in 1866,19 and Rhode Island
followed in 1893.20 More recently, at least thirteen jurisdic-
tions have enacted analogous provisions, 21 and California,
22
17 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 14; Note, A Divorce Reform Act, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS.
563, 568-69 (1968); and Kay, supra note 11, at 1217-20.
l8Ch. 498, [1850] Ky. Laws 54-55. The statute provided that the couple had to be
physically separated for five years in order to obtain a divorce.
19 Ch. 37, § I, [1866] Wis. Laws 40. The Wisconsin statute provided that a divorce
could be granted if the parties had voluntarily lived apart for five years.20 Ch. 1187, § 1, [1893] R.I. Laws 237. The Rhode Island statute required that the
parties live apart for at least ten years.
21 Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1959); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-312(7) (1956); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202(7) (Supp. 1965); Colorado,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1(j) (1963); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.041(10)
(Supp. 1971); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-610 (1963); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.020(l)(b) (1963); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:301 (1965); Nevada,.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1969); New York, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney
Supp. 1971); Rhode Island, 3A R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3 (1970); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Supp. 1964); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.020(9)
(1958); and Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 321(9) (1955).
Of course, each statute varies as to its definition of "no-fault" divorce. While it is,
therefore, difficult to generalize, Professor Wadlington has described the bulk of the
statutes as providing that:
(I) either spouse may bring the action for divorce on... a [no-fault] ground;
(2) the separation need not have been voluntary on the part of both spouses;
(3) there must have been a continuous separation of a specific duration
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (4) traditional fault
defenses are inapplicable.
Wadlington, supra note 9, at 63-64.
Professor Walker, in his excellent article discussing the new California no-fault divorce
law, supra note 10, at 199- 204, describes some early "incompatibility" statutes, as well as
the separation statutes listed above.
22 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). The California statute provides two grounds
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Iowa, 23 and Texas 24 have within the last three years approved
more liberal no-fault statutes without the separation requirement.
Also, the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 brought no-fault divorce to
England and Wales.
25
These enactments prompted a recommendation by the Mich-
igan Law Revision Commission for similar reform in Michigan.
The recommendation stated:
Michigan currently employs the traditional fault grounds
for divorce. This means the complaining spouse must show
that he or she is the 'innocent party' who has been wronged
by the other spouse in a manner which gives legal grounds for
divorce. The most frequently used ground in Michigan and
most other states is extreme cruelty, a vague term which can
be applied loosely by liberal judges and strictly by those who
believe in the indissolubility of marriage. The evidence used
at trial consists of a recital by the plaintiff of a wide variety of
the spouse's misdeeds which may range from physical abuse
to such minor things as constant nagging and criticism. The
present divorce statute creates much hardship, unfairness and
incongruity because:
(1) Since one spouse is seldom significantly more at fault
than the other, the proceeding is often based on fiction
rather than fact.
(2) In order to assure the granting of divorce, the avoid-
ance of a contested hearing and the delays incident
thereto, divorce participants are often pressured to
make unfair and unreasonable concessions as to child
custody, alimony, child support or property division.
(3) A recital of the defendant's alleged cruel acts results in
increased hostility between the spouses, making recon-
ciliation more improbable and the resulting bitterness
impedes the working out of suitable arrangements for
for dissolution of the marriage: "(I) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage; and (2) Incurable insanity." Enactment of a new
divorce law was but part of a general revision of that state's family law in 1969. Family
Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, [1969] Cal. Stats. 33 14-44. There is an excellent symposium
discussing the new California law at I PACIFIC L.J. 147 (1970).
23 IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (197 1) provides that a marriage can be dissolved when the
evidence shows "breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate
objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no likelihood that the
marriage can be preserved."
24 A 1969 revision of the Texas Family Code adds to the traditional fault grounds for
divorce a separate no-fault ground where "the marriage has become insupportable because
of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage
relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation:" TEx. FAMILY
CODE ANN. tit. I, § 301 (Supp. 1969).
25 Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55, §§ 1-2. For a discussion of the English act, see B.
PASSINGHAM, THE DIVORCE REFORM ACT 1969 (1970): and B. LEE, DIVORCE LAW
REFORM IN ENGLAND (1970).
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custody of the children, visitation rights, alimony,
child-support and property settlement.
(4) The most significant issue, whether the parties can
have viable marriage, is generally ignored.
26
The Commission then indicated three possible ways to achieve
reform of the Michigan divorce law: (1) a complete revision of the
family laws and the elimination of fault grounds for divorce; (2)
the addition of a non-fault ground to existing fault grounds; or (3)
the substitution of one non-fault ground for the present fault
groundS.
Iowa and California had recently adopted the first sweeping
approach, eliminating fault grounds within a comprehensive statu-
tory reform of all family law statutes. The Commission thought
that while the comprehensive approach might be the ideal method,
"its implementation is not deemed feasible because of the time
involved in drafting an entirely new family code as well as in
resolving the legislative disputes that [might arise] as to many
varied sections of the code. "
28
The Commission next pointed out that Texas in adopting the
second method of divorce reform had merely added a no-fault
ground to the existing fault grounds. This approach was also
rejected by the Commission:
Although this allows parties to use the more honest and less
traumatic approach, it does not guarantee that they will do so.
To have a statute allowing both approaches creates a philo-
sophical inconsistency which is difficult to justify.29
The Commission finally opted for the third approach:
Since it is possible by a very simple piece of legislation to
eliminate the existing fault grounds and replace them with a
single non-fault ground, this seems to be the wisest course of
action at the present time, It quickly erradicates the most
offensive portion of our divorce law and in no way precludes
a future, comprehensive revision of our laws affecting the
family.30
Realizing the need for clarity and simplicity, the Commission
recommended the adoption of the language used in the Iowa
reform which permits divorce where " 'there has been a break-
26 MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMMISSION, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as COMMISSION].
2 7 Id. at 8.
28 Id. at 9. See notes 22- 23 supra for a description of the California and Iowa reforms.
29 COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 9. See note 24 supra for a description of the Texas
reform.
30 COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 9.
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down of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate
objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.' "31 The
Commission ended its recommendation by emphasizing that di-
vorce reform would not increase family breakdowns, but make the
legal procedure fairer and less traumatic for all involved. 32
Michigan legislators, prompted by the reforms made in other
states and by the recommendation of the Law Revision Commis-
sion, enacted a provision for no-fault divorce in the summer of
1971, 3 which took effect in January 1972. The major change is
the elimination of specific fault grounds for divorce.34 Under the
new law the plaintiff need do no more than allege in the complaint
"that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to
the extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and
there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
preserved." 35 The defendant may in his answer simply admit or
deny the allegations of the complainant, and need give no further
explanation? 6 The court may enter a judgment dissolving the
bonds of matrimony as long as there is some evidence supporting
the complaint. 37 An action for separate maintenance may be filed
in a circuit court in a similar fashion, 38 in which case the court
may enter a judgment dissolving the marriage, if a counterclaim
for divorce has been filed, or a judgment of separate maintenance,
if such a counterclaim has not been filed.3 9 The statute is silent on
the issues of alimony, property settlement and custody rights.
II1. UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS IN MICHIGAN
Reformers and supporters of no-fault divorce in Michigan em-
phasized several defects in the old divorce statute and benefits to
be gained from a no-fault system.40 First, as the Michigan Law
3' Id. at 10.
32 1d. at II.
33 Pub. A. No. 75 (3 Michigan Legislative Service 126 (1971)).
34 The prior Michigan law provided several grounds for divorce, including adultery,
physical incompetence at the time of marriage, imprisonment, desertion for two years and
habitual drunkenness. A divorce from bed and board could be granted under the prior law
for extreme cruelty and utter desertion for two years. Both provisions are superseded by
the new law.
35 Pub. A. No. 75, § 1 (3 Michigan Legislative Service 126 (1971) ) (to be codified
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6()).
36 Id. (to be codified MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6(2)).
37 Id. (to be codified MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6(3)).
3 8 id. (to be codified MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 552.7(1)).
39 Id. (to be codified MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.7(4)(a) & (b)).
40 Two articles which discuss at length both the rationale and probable effects of the
new law appeared in the Michigan State Bar Journal after the divorce reform was enacted.
See Honigman, What 'No-Fault' Means To Divorce, 51 MICH. ST.B.J. 16 (1972) and
Snyder, Divorce Michigan Style-1972 and Beyond, 50 MICH. ST.B.J. 740 (1971). Mr.
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Revision Commission stated, the old divorce statute created much
"hardship, unfairness and incongruity," because in this area of
delicate human relationships total guilt on the part of one spouse
and total innocence on the part of the other is rare. 4' Second, to
meet the all-or-nothing criteria of the old law, the proceeding was
often based on fiction rather than fact; testimony could easily be
faked or exaggerated to comply with the statutory fault stan-
dards. 4 2 Third, accusations made in court did not help to promote
a reconciliation between the parties!a3 Also, this adversary setting
and resulting hostility was hardly conducive to reasonable alimo-
ny, child support, and property settlements. Fourth, in order to
avoid a contested hearing and to obtain a divorce in a minimum of
time, one party often had to "barter for his freedom at the cheap-
est price obtainable," that price being either "excessive or in-
adequate alimony or property settlement, or in custodial rights not
necessarily geared to the best interests of the child."44 Finally, the
whole divorce proceeding was not only slow, humiliating and
costly,4 5 but often ignored the basic issue of whether the marriage
had broken down to the point where all hope of reconciliation was
gone. 46 In addition to noticing these defects in the old law which
could be ameliorated by a no-fault divorce law, proponents of the
reform stressed the right of parties to a marriage beyond repair to
obtain their freedom as quickly and efficiently as possible.
47
The opinions expressed by the opponents of the bill varied in
origin and emphasis. Some were purely religious objections, 48
while others were social 49 and procedural. 50 The critics of divorce
Honigman is Chairman of the Michigan Law Revision Commission which proposed the
pew divorce law, and Mr. Snyder is Chairman of the Family Law Committee of the State
Bar of Michigan.
The arguments made in support of divorce reform in Michigan did not differ substan-
tially from the arguments that have been made in support of no-fault divorce in other
states. For a collection of recent writings on the subject, see notes 14- 17 supra.
41 COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 7; 774 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2050 (1968).
42 COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 7; and Honigman, supra note 40, at 22.
43 COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 7-8; and Honigman, supra note 40, at 20.
44 Honigman, supra note 40, at 17. See also, COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 7.
4Honigman, supra note 40, at 16.
46 COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 8.
47 Honigman, supra note 40, at 17; and COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 1I.
48 There appears to have been little public pressure against divorce liberalization in
Michigan, contrary to the experience in England and Italy.
49 See Honigman, supra note 40, at 17. The Michigan Inter-Professional Association on
Marriage, Divorce and the Family, Inc., an informal research and discussion group,
composed of members of the bench, bar, clergy, social workers, psychologists, psy-
chiatrists and physicians, opposed the divorce reform.
50 See, e.g., Campbell, Children's Rights in Divorce Without Fault, 50 MICH. ST.B.J. 73
(1971), in which Judge Campbell stressed the right of a minor child to the "continuation of
its parents' marriage during the period of both physical and emotional growth and devel-
opment of the child until he reaches an age where separation from the parent who leaves
home will not substantially damage the growth and development of the child." Id. at 74.
The Family Law Committee of the Michigan Bar Association also opposed the no-fault
divorce law. See 50 MICH. ST.B.J. 537 (1971).
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reform argued that liberalization would not only burden the courts
with more divorce proceedings, but would also contribute to a
weakened marriage institution. 51 Since there was no opinion poll
or referendum taken on the issue, it is difficult to postulate how
the people of Michigan reacted toward the divorce law reform.
Nonetheless, the absence of a significant opposition movement by
religious groups and the relative ease with which the bill was
enacted5 2 are substantial indications that there were few strong
opponents to the reform.
In retrospect it is clear that the changing status of women,
increasing permissiveness in social attitudes generally, and the
fact that not only divorce by consent but also unilateral divorce
(by either cruelty or desertion) was already obtainable in the
courts, all prepared the ground for reform. Moreover, awareness
on the part of lawyers, courts, and legislators of the defects of the
fault-oriented law no doubt contributed to the sentiment for re-
form.
51 A statement made by Senator Fleming, a Catholic, was representative of such views:
[Flirst and foremost, this bill, if signed into law by the governor, will
officially place the State of Michigan on record as favoring the easy breakup
of marriages.
Second, the State will be providing a quick procedure for the destruction
of marriages when the emphasis should be placed on preservation of the
family as the basic unit of our state and nation.
Third, this bill goes far beyond the provisions of any form of "No-fault"
divorce legislation passed in three other states-in fact, it is the most radical
proposal ever put forth....
Fourth, this bill will actually encourage divorces and broken homes by
sanctioning immorality and irresponsibility by husband or wife....
Undisputed in debate on this bill, was the fact that in California where a
form of "No-fault" divorce was enacted, more divorces have been filed, more
granted and the courts have experienced an enormous increase in trials....
Sixth, this "No-fault" divorce bill does not eliminate rancor and bitterness
between competing parties based on the California experience and in fact has
increased it and meant a further court log jam in pending cases as well as
additional costs to the State for more judges and court personnel to handle
the large increase in divorce litigation....
Seventh, this State should be placing greater emphasis on the education of
people to marital responsibility prior to issuance of a marriage license-not
on the ease by which it can be dissolved .... We can expect our divorce rate
to zoom if and when this bill becomes law, we can expect to see more
immorality and irresponsibility on the part of the parties to a marriage, we
can expect more children to be on A.D.C.....
The basic philosophical issues of modern society and we have chosen the
philosophy of irresponsibility. When the divorce rate sky-rockets, when
immorality becomes commonplace, when the taxpayers revolt in disgust at
the ever increasing A.D.C. and welfare rolls caused by broken homes, when
our court systems become even further behind in handling huge case loads of
custody, support and property disputes caused by this bill, do not say you
were not warned of the consequences-for surely society as a whole will pay
dearly for the passage of this bill here today ....
91 MICH. S. JOUR. 1396-71 (1971).
52 The reform bill passed the Michigan House by a vote of 72-22. 55 MIcH. H. JOUR.
1100 (1971), and passed the Senate by a vote of 23- 12, 91 MIcH. S. JOUR. 1368 (197 I).
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Traditional attachment to a long standing social institution and
practical political considerations have often been the most difficult
obstacles to overcome in enacting legal reforms., 3 Indeed, one of
the recurring themes in the history of legal thought is the debate
between the historical and analytical approaches. The controversy
is between those who believe that law is found not made and
therefore should essentially follow, not lead (and that it should do
so slowly in response to clearly formulated social sentiments), and
those who believe that the law is the will of the state and therefore
should be a determined agent in the creation of new norms. Both
sides would probably agree that the law has to be constantly
reassessed against the social framework in order to meet the
changing social needs of the people. Yet, in the constant and
complex battle of social forces on which man's future depends,
the law is but one of many molding elements. The Michigan
divorce law reform contains in microcosm many of the basic
dilemmas of the modern legislative process. Law reform is not
exclusively a legal problem but a social, political and moral prob-
lem as well.
IV. IMPACT OF THE REFORM
It is too early to assess the full impact of the 1971 Michigan
divorce law. A major determinative factor will be the manner in
which the courts interpret the terse language of the act. It may be
inappropriate to assume that a court will merely accept at face
value an allegation that there has been a "breakdown of marriage
relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been
destroyed and there remains no likelihood that the marriage can
be preserved." 54 Since the act does not further define this lan-
guage 55 the Michigan courts will have to critically examine the
phrases "breakdown of marriage relationship, "58 "objects of mat-
53 For a short argument in favor of retaining established laws and traditions, see Turner,
supra note 13, at 72-73.
54 Pub. A. No. 75, §1 (3 Michigan Legislative Service 126 (1971)) (to be codified
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6(3) ). This same section requires that "evidence be taken
in open court." Snyder, supra note 40, at 742-43, notes that while the legislature has
expressly provided that an agreement that the marital relationship has broken down is not
binding on the court, it should be given great weight and that "there is and should be a
different standard of proof for the uncontested case than there is for the contested case."
55 Unlike section 2(1) of the English Divorce Reform Act of 1969 which lists five sets of
facts, at least one of which must be met before the marriage can be said to have
"irretrievably" broken down, the Michigan statute gives the courts little definitional help.
Honigman, supra note 40, at 17-20, forcefully argues for the simpler, Michigan "common
sense" approach and gives several examples of how the Michigan standard should be
applied to specific fact situations.56 This first phrase is apparently the heart of the factual question, and a court presum-
ably would find a marital breakdown and hence a basis for divorce, only if the two
subordinate phrases which follow have been met.
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Divorce Law Reform
rimony,"5 7 and "no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
preserved,"'58 and develop some kind of evidentiary guidelines.
While applying the "marital breakdown" standard should not
present insurmountable difficulties, the new statute does raise
certain basic questions. One is whether the Michigan standard is
objective or subjective-whether there must be hard observable
facts of breakdown or whether the "marital breakdown" is merely
a state of mind. The California statute apparently contemplated
that observable acts and occurrences need not be present.59 An-
other problem may arise when courts are asked to grant a divorce
when only one spouse feels there is no hope of reconciliation.
While several authorities suggest the standard should be a unilat-
eral one,60 the question is not free from doubt.61 Moreover, one
can imagine a judge, whose commitment to the institution of
marriage is deeper than that of the immediate parties, denying a
divorce for a single act of adultery, cruelty or desertion,62 even
though he would have been bound under the old law to grant a
divorce upon a showing that such a marital offense had been
committed. Instances may well arise where the judge denies a
divorce when both parties want it, simply because he feels a
breakdown has not occurred. 63 Most troublesome, however, is the
degree to which proof of misconduct, with its tendency to produce
bitterness and hostility, is still necessary in divorce proceedings.
Although such evidence should as a general rule not be required,
the contrary may be true in adjudicating custodial rights, property
settlements, and other financial questions. 64 Indeed, the new law
may shift the focus of litigation from the divorce itself to wrangl-
57 Snyder, supra note 40, at 742, lists several discernible objects of marriage:
Bearing and rearing children, economic goals, the status attached to being
husband or wife, acceptance within the section of society within which one
functions, sexual fulfillment, mutual kindness, affection and respect, emotion-
al support-the list may indeed be endless. Any statutory definition should
start with those objects which the community-or at least the overwhelming
majority-would agree must be present in any marriage.
58 This last test serves as a check on granting divorce when the marriage breakdown is
only temporary and not permanent as contemplated by the law. In facing this fact question,
Honigman, supra note 40, at 18, suggests that courts look at "circumstances surrounding
the termination of the marriage relationship, the length of time it has continued and the
conduct of the parties since separation."
59 Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law,
supra note 15, at 1319- 20.
6 0 d., Honigman, supra note 40, at 18.
61 See, e.g., Couch, supra note 15, at 257.
62 This problem is discussed in light of the English experience in Paulsen, supra note 14,
at 97.
63 Honigman suggests that where both parties agree that the marriage has broken down,
the court should rarely require additional testimony to hold the standard satisfied. Honig-
man, supra note 40, at 22.
64 Id. at 20-2 1, and Snyder, supra note 40, at 743-44.
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ing about child custody and property issues, since the act makes
no changes in the laws applicable to those areas. This possibility
of protracted litigation has led one lawyer to suggest a two-part
process for contested divorce actions: one to determine if the
"marital breakdown" standard had been met; the other, and pre-
sumably more lenghty part, to settle financial and custodial is-
sues.65
Nevertheless, a recent California proceeding indicates the liber-
al manner in which a court may choose to apply a no-fault divorce
law. The husband was on the witness stand for less than twenty
seconds.
"Have irreconcilable differences developed in your mar-
riage?" his lawyer asked.
"Have those differences brought a breakdown of your mar-
riage?"
"Yes."
"Is there any chance of a reconciliation?"
"No." 66
That was the extent of the testimony which "dissolved" a 19-year
union.
A recurring question is the impact which the newly enacted
provision will have on the divorce rate.6 7 While there is a dearth
of statistical data on the impact of recent no-fault divorce statutes,
figures tend to suggest that the new California statute is producing
a small but real increase in the number of divorces.6 8 The exact
size of the increase is difficult to determine because of the adjust-
ment that must be made for those Californians getting divorced in
6 Honigman, supra note 40, at 23- 24.
66 Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1971, at 9, col. 3.
67 Figures compiled by the Washtenaw County Circuit Court in Ann Arbor, Michigan,
and by the Wayne County Circuit Court in Detroit, Michigan, show an increase in the
number of divorce petitions filed in the first two months of the new Michigan law's
operation over the number filed during the corresponding period in previous years. How-
ever, it is difficult to generalize from only two months' data.
WASHTENAW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
1969 1970 1971 1972
January 121 97 97 133
February 92 79 110 187
WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
1969 1970 1971 1972
January 1083 1114 927 1168
February 1104 1083 1044 1209
68 Figures were compiled by Dr. Louis F. Saylor, State Director of Public Health in
Berkeley, who indicated the divorce ratio was up about 16 percent from 1969 to 1970.
National Observer, Jan. 25, 1971, at 17, col. 4.
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their home state rather than going to Nevada.69 Similarly, one can
only speculate on the degree to which any future rise in the
Michigan divorce rate is directly attributable to the new law as
opposed to other factors such as younger marriage, longer life
spans, circumstantial difficulties such as housing shortages and the
mood of a "permissive society" as a whole. As one California
judge has suggested, there should be less concern about the slight
increase in the divorce rate in light of the fact that husbands and
wives who have lived together in bitterness and even hatred can
now start new lives.
70
Finally, no-fault divorce laws may decrease the cost of obtain-
ing a divorce. In addition to the usual filing fees and incidental
costs, protracted litigation before the reform involved substantial
attorneys' fees. While indigents may have escaped this financial
burden by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Boddie
v. Connecticut,71 which held unconstitutional the denial of a di-
vorce to an indigent because of his inability to pay the necessary
fees, and by obtaining some form of free legal service, 72 a substan-
tial segment of the population may have found the costs high or
even prohibitive. 73 The new Michigan law still requires a court
appearance, with all the attendant expense, but possibly the sim-
plified procedure and fact determination will require far less ex-
pense than before. Michigan has not instituted "mail order" di-
vorce,74 but the new law may be a first step in making divorce
equally available to all citizens, regardless of wealth.
V. CONCLUSION
Lifelong marriage is often considered the only basis of a secure
and stable family life and the only way to insure a healthy physi-
69 Id. At one point in 1970, the number of divorces being granted in Nevada was down
approximately 15 percent from 1969, and Nevada officials blamed the new California
reform for the decrease. Professor Brody in California's Divorce Reform: Its Sociological
Implications, I PACIFIC L.J. 223, 225-26 (1970), discusses various factors contributing to
California's increased divorce rate.
70 Statement by Superior Court Justice William Hogoboom in Chicago Tribune, July 4,
197 1, at 9, col. 3.
71401 U.S. 371 (1971).
72 See Goldberger, Legal Aid Divorces-A Practical Approach, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 30
(1970), for a discussion of the plight of poor people who want a divorce.
73 Filing and incidental fees usually are about $40 and attorneys' fees in Michigan about
$400, provided no special problems, such as property disputes, are involved.
74 The new California law provides an even simpler process than Michigan, with the
services of an attorney apparently not required. See Johnson, The Family Law Act: A
Guide to the Practicioner, I PACIFIC L. J. 147 (1970), for a step-by-step analysis of how a
divorce is to be obtained under the California reform.
It appears that one California county, Contra Costa, has initiated a divorce procedure
which costs only $36 and does not require a court appearance. See Detroit Free Press,
Nov. 29, 1971, at 9-B, col. 4.
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cal and emotional development for children of the marriage. From
the early ecclesiastical law to the present, the indissolubility of
marriage has been a predominant theme. Yet, the state has
through the years recognized that in certain circumstances if a
marriage could not be dissolved, it would not only be contrary to
public policy, but would also inflict unnecessary hardship on all
parties. In those limited situations, the law has provided a proce-
dure for ending the marriage.
The trend toward liberalizing divorce statutes is based on a
very practical political consideration, that is, the increasing real-
ization that a state cannot police all religious, ethical and family
matters. Law alone cannot create or perpetuate family happiness.
A state can refuse to break the bonds of matrimony, but it cannot
bind the spouses to love each other or to live together happily.
The provisions for care and custody of the children may be
carefully guaranteed by the law, but the law cannot preserve the
home.
If the aim of divorce law, then, is to offer quick and painless
relief to couples suffering a broken marriage, Michigan has taken
a giant step forward. The simplified divorce procedure should
make divorce less expensive and more equitable for all couples
whose marriage is beyond repair.
The effect of this new statute on the marriage institution is less
certain. The concept of no-fault divorce is likely to have a greater
impact on future generations than on the present one, which
continues to be influenced by the traditional social stigma at-
tached to divorce. Future generations growing up under the new
system will certainly accept the new formula as the standard form
of divorce and their attitudes toward marriage and divorce will be
influenced in the process. Yet, the reasons for marital breakdown
lie deep in the culture and personalities that society has produced,





Public Acts of 1971
Approved by Governor
July 29, 1971
An Act to amend sections 6, 7, 19 and 29 of chapter 84 of the
Revised Statutes of 1846, entitled "Of divorce," section 19 as
amended by Act No. 182 of the Public Acts of 1970, being
sections 552.6, 552.7, 552.19 and 552.29 of the Compiled Laws
of 1948; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Section 1. Sections 6, 7, 19 and 29 of chapter 84 of the Revised
Statutes of 1846, section 19 as amended by Act No. 182 of the
Public Acts of 1970, being sections 552.6, 552.7, 552.19 and
552.29 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, are amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 6. (1) A complaint for divorce may be filed in the circuit
court upon the allegation that there has been a breakdown of the
marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony
have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood
that ,the marriage can be preserved. In the complaint the plaintiff
shall make no other explanation of the grounds for divorce than
by the use of the statutory language.
(2) The defendant, by answer, may either admit the grounds
for divorce alleged or deny them without further explanation. An
admission by the defendant of the grounds for divorce may be
considered by the court but is not binding on the court's determi-
nation.
(3) The court shall enter a judgment dissolving the bonds of
matrimony if evidence is presented in open court that there has
been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that
the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains
no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.
Sec. 7. (1) An action for separate maintenance may be filed in
the circuit court in the same manner and on the same grounds as
an action for divorce. In the complaint the plaintiff shall make no
other explanation of the grounds for separate maintenance than by
use of the statutory language.
(2) The defendant, by answer, may either admit the grounds
for separate maintenance alleged or deny them without further
explanation. An admission by the defendant of the grounds for
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separate maintenance may be considered by the court but is not
binding on the court's determination. The defendant may also file
a counterclaim for divorce.
(3) If the defendant files a counterclaim for divorce, the allega-
tion contained in the plaintiff's complaint as to the grounds for
separate maintenance may be considered by the court but is not
binding on the court's determination.
(4) If evidence is presented in open court that there has been a
breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the
objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved, the
court shall enter:
(a) A judgment of separate maintenance if a counterclaim for
divorce has not been filed.
(b) A judgment dissolving the bonds of matrimony if a coun-
terclaim for divorce has been filed.
Sec. 19. Upon the annulment of a marriage, a divorce from the
bonds of matrimony or a judgment of separate maintenance, the
court may make a further judgment for restoring to either party
the whole, or such parts as it shall deem just and reasonable, of
the real and personal estate that shall have come to either party
by reason of the marriage, or for awarding to either party the
value thereof, to be paid by either party in money.
Sec. 29. The legitimacy of all children begotten before the
commencement of any action under this act shall be presumed
until the contrary be shown.
Section 2. Sections 8, 9d, 10, 18, 24, 40, 41, 42, 44 and 47 of
chapter 84 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, as amended, being
sections 552.8, 552.9d, 552.10, 552.18, 552.24, 552.40, 552.41,
552.42, 552.44 and 552.46 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, and
Act No. 243 of the Public Acts of 1889, being sections 552.301
and 552.302 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, are repealed.
Section 3. The provisions of this amendatory act shall apply to all
actions for divorce or separate maintenance commenced on or
after the effective date of this act. An action for divorce or
separate maintenance pending at the effective date of this act shall
be consummated in accordance with and subject to the law in
force at the time the action was commenced except that the
provisions of this amendatory act shall be made applicable to a
pending action for divorce or separate maintenance if either party
amends his respective complaint or counterclaim at any time
before trial to allege the new grounds for divorce or separate
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maintenance by use of the statutory language prescribed in this
amendatory act.
Section 4. This act shall take effect January 1, 1972.
This act is ordered to take immediate effect.
